In Defence of Murdo Fraser

I must point out that this post is not about Murdo Fraser as a person. I have never had the good or misfortune to have met the man personally. So I have nothing to say about him. Nor am I about to defend his political positions as I oppose just about everything he and other conservatives stand for.

No, this post is a defence of Mr Fraser’s right to be a MSP. I regularly on twitter come across comments to the effect that Mr Fraser has never “won” an election, has repeatedly been “rejected” by the voters and therefore has no right to be in Parliament at all.

I find this argument not just unconvincing, but a serious misrepresentation and attack on the voting system we have for elections to Holyrood. It is also potentially dangerous as it could lead to a change is this system.

Our electoral system for the Scottish Parliament is a hybrid one, a mixture of First Past the Post(FPTP)  and Proportional Representation(PR). It is similar to the system used in Germany. There are 73 constituencies, each of which elects one MSP by FPTP. The other 56 MSPs are elected  in eight regional constituencies, each of which elects seven MSPs. These Additional Members are elected using a form of PR.

The system is deliberately designed to ensure that the total representation from each of the eight regions, including those MSPs elected by FPTP, corresponds more closely to the share of the votes cast for each political party in that region.

The key word here is representation. The system as a whole is not about winning, but about ensuring fair representation in Parliament for the parties that the electors have voted for.

In this sense Mr Fraser has as much right to be in Parliament as any other MSP, irrespective of whether elected by FPTP or PR.  Mr Fraser was elected by the voters in the Mid-Scotland Fife regional constituency. Or more precisely, by the 25% of the voters in the region who voted Conservative in the 2016 election.

These conservative voters have the same right to be fairly represented in Parliament as do the 6% who voted for the Green party, or the 7% who voted for the LibDems, or the 18% who voted Labour, or the 41% who voted SNP.  All these voters are entitled to be as fairly as possible represented in Parliament.

The hybrid system we use in Scotland is not a fully proportional system. This is due to the larger number of MSPs elected by FPTP. In Germany their version of the Additional Member System is fully proportional. This means that there can always be some small anomalies.

As happened in the 2016 election in Mid-Scotland and Fife region. However the anomaly did not affect the number of MSPs elected for the Greens, the LidDems, nor for the Conservatives. It did though affect the number of MSPs elected for the SNP and Labour. The SNP vote share of 41% should have resulted in seven MSPs. However as the SNP won eight of the single member constituencies, elected by FPTP, they were able to retain all of these eight MSPs. To the detriment of Labour, whose 18% share of the vote should have given them three MSPs instead of the two they were allocated.

So, if anybody wants to reconsider the justness of the results in 2016 in Mid-Scotland it would not be about the Conservatives, but about how an unfair system resulted in the SNP winning a seat that should have gone to Labour. Any takers?

As a complement to the above, I did a bit of research into the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, using the House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7599. This Briefing Papers gives all the details about that election. I was particularly interested in the share of the vote for the “winning” candidates in the 73 single member constituencies.

It transpires that only 29 of the “winning” candidates won over 50% of the votes in their constituency. This represents just 40% of the 73 constituency MSPs. Or just over 22% of all 129 MSPs. Or to put is another way,  44 constituency MSPs were rejected by a majority of the voters in their constituency. This amounts to 60% of all constituency MSPs.

In this context it is worth noting that eight constituency MSPs “won” their seat with less than 40% of the votes cast. Quite how this is regarded as legitimate while Mr Fraser and the other regional MSPs can be held to be illegitimate is a bit beyond me.

Out of interest the MSP with the lowest “winning” share of the vote is none other than Ruth Davidson. She was elected in Edinburgh Central with just 30.4%  of the votes cast. Of these eight MSPs elected with less than 40% of the votes cast, four are Conservative, two are Labour and two are SNP.

None of the previous paragraph should be interpreted as denying these eight MSPs their right to be in Parliament. What it should do is to raise some serious questions about the legitimacy of retaining FPTP as part of our electoral system.

I would much prefer a fully PR system. Parliament is where our representatives sit. As such the terms winning and losing should be used much less often. What matters is fair representation for the way voters cast their votes.  For those interested in this I would recommend a look at the systems used in Denmark and Sweden.

 

Brexit – saving May’s deal?

A New Year and time to put some thoughts to paper once again. Not that a lot has changed with pretty much the same story dominating the media. With Brexit we are still mired in the deep impasse that has existed more or less since the referendum. As the estimable David Allen Green reminds us: “In a matter of weeks, UK will leave EU by automatic operation of law, without a deal. This is the default unless deal is agreed, or there is an extension, or A50 is revoked. None of these three possibilities currently seem likely.”

The deal that David Allen Green refers to is in a Withdrawal Agreement. It is worth reminding ourselves of this. The deal is about how the UK formally leaves the EU. It provides for a transition period, more realistically a standstill period, which will last for two or possibly four years. This is to allow for the brand new, comprehensive trade deal between the UK and the EU that everyone says they want. Most trade experts reckon that even four years is a tad optimistic for negotiating and implement such a new deal. But we can for the moment safely kick this particular can down the road.  More immediate and pressing issues are at hand.

The key one is can Theresa May get her deal through parliament? For a second time the UK parliament is about to start debating this Withdrawal Agreement (WA). A vote is expected to take place next week. According to most informed observers the WA is almost certain to fail. For one reason or another most Brexiteers dislike the WA, even though it does achieve what they want – leaving the EU. However, many Brexiteers fear that, in part because of the Northern Ireland backstop, any future trade deal with the EU will leave the UK so closely aligned with the EU that the UK becomes a rule taker. The infamous BINO outcome – Brexit in name only.

A majority of the rest of the MPs also oppose the WA, either because they oppose Brexit altogether, or as Labour claim, they insist they can get a better WA. So the best guess, note guess, not a prediction, is that the WA will fail.

However all is not lost for Theresa May and her WA. She and the government are trying to frighten enough MPs to vote for the WA on the grounds that the alternative is a No deal Brexit. Something that would be so damaging to the economy that nobody in their right mind would allow it to happen.

The difficulty for May is that the majority of Brexiteers prefer a No deal outcome to the WA. Indeed for many, possibly most of them No deal is their preferred outcome. The prospect of No deal is most unlikely to win over this group of Brexiteers. Quite the opposite.

On the other hand those who oppose Brexit or hope for a better WA don’t seem to believe that the government would actually, when push comes to shove, go through with a No deal outcome. Some of the recent moves in parliament are designed to avoid a No deal.

An alternative approach for Mrs May would be to threaten recalcitrant Brexiteers not with a No deal, but with No Brexit. The prospect of revoking article 50 and remaining in the hated EU might well concentrate the minds of all but a few Brexiteers.

The difficulty for Mrs May with this approach is that neither she nor the government can seriously push for this – remaining in EU. If she did make this a realistic option, then while she might win back Brexiteers, she runs the risk of losing as many pro Remain MPs. I am thinking of the likes of Ken Clarke and Anna Soubry for example.

So, somehow the government has to make revoking article 50 genuinely possible, but not definite and not with government support. The most recent amendments in parliament, which in principle return power to MPs, may well paradoxically work in favour of May’s deal. Not at the moment though. Jacob Rees-Mogg for one doesn’t appear to be worried.

However, as someone once said, a week is a long time in politics. So, to recap, the WA is still unlikely to pass in parliament, but it cannot be completely ruled out. MPs work and vote in mysterious ways.

Further speculation can await the result of the vote on the WA next week.

Independence is the radical, revolutionary choice

This post is my initial response to the recent article by Gerry Hassan on Bella Caledonia. Entitled “Time to Wake Up and Ask Some Difficult Questions about the SNP and Independence” . It is a very interesting piece and well worth reading, along with the comments, some of which are good and others, not so. You can access it here.

Gerry raises some very pertinent questions, but as many commentators have pointed out, very little in the way of answers. He does give a sort of answer to one of his own questions, but it is not one I can agree with at all.

Gerry raises what he considers to be “the big strategic question – what is independence the answer to?” He goes on to write that, “For some, this question has an obvious answer: independence is an end in itself to be a sovereign nation.” However this is not a satisfactory answer as far as Gerry is concerned. For he continues, “But that is the response of Nationalist Scotland (whether in or out of the SNP) and does not address how the majority of Scots who don’t see the world in these terms are motivated to sign up to the cause.”

To the extent that Gerry offers us an answer to the big strategic question, it is rather vague, to whit, “Independence has to be for something bigger and bolder, with a clear vision, if it is to cut through, to tell an engaging story, and to speak beyond true believers.”

I am a bit bemused by Gerry’s framing of the first answer he gives to his question. He opts for what he claims is the standard Nationalist Scotland response. Which is fair enough in a way, but does beg the question – what are the other non Nationalist Scotland responses? The failure to mention even one, would seem to indicate that Gerry thinks there are no other responses. Which must have come as a bit of a surprise to Greens, socialists and others. Presumably he just gives what he claims to be the standard “nationalist” response to that he can then dismiss it as inadequate.

Now I agree with Gerry that this is in many ways the big strategic question. But as such it deserves a bit more consideration than Gerry offers. For a start the answer can be framed in democratic terms. In which case the question that independence answers is, Who decides? With independence the key decisions about the kind of Scotland we will live in will be decided by the votes of the people who live in Scotland. And not as at present, by the votes of people who live in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Now Gerry might contend that this answers means that Scotland becomes a sovereign nation. Which would be true, but the framing and the emphasis is not longer a “nationalist” one, but a democratic one.

I was also struck by Gerry’s apparent penchant for seeing things in an either/or frame. This is clearly to be seen in his claim that “nationalists” see “independence is an end in itself.” Now this may well be the case and not just for those who might describe themselves as “nationalists”. However independence is also a beginning. Without independence we, the people who live in Scotland, don’t get to decide ourselves what kind of Scotland we want to live in. But with independence comes a new beginning, in which we can seek to convince a majority of our fellow citizens of our particular vision for the future of Scotland. Without having to rely on voters in the rest of the UK.

Gerry also seems to trapped in an either/or frame when he writes, “Independence has to be for something bigger and bolder.” As one commentator replied, “No, it doesn’t. I’m not after radical change. And I’m entitled to my own reasons.”  He is of course correct. It is perfectly possible and honourable for someone to want independence and at the same time not want radical change. The reason this is so, comes back again to the democratic justification, indeed necessity for independence. If Scotland is to remain more or less as she is now, with little or no radical change, then that should be result of choices made by the voters in Scotland. As opposed to something that is imposed or forced on us.

For those of us, like myself, who are in favour of some significant radical changes, then we will only achieve this when and if, we can persuade our fellow citizens that this is right way forward.

Which is why all of us, those who want radical change and those who do not, can work together to achieve independence. For only with independence can we ensure that choices about our future will depend on us. Independence in the context of the UK is in itself the most radical and revolutionary change we can aspire to.

 

 

 

 

 

Is Denmark a small ethno state?

This is my first post on this blog for a very long time. I have finally felt impelled to write something after watching a live transmission of Carles Puigdemont’s appearance in Copenhagen university. It was an interesting event, all conducted in English. Sr Puigdemont was very impressive, especially in answering questions.  What most got me raging was the contribution of Marlene Wind, professor in European politics and law at the university. (thanks Marlene) Her presentation was one of the most ill-informed, ignorant and condescending speeches I have had the misfortune to hear. Even Donald Trump might have been a bit ashamed at her ignorance.

I will not bother to refute most of her distortions, Sr Puigdemont did a pretty good job of that. However I was particularly struck by Marlene Wind’s accusation that independence for Catalunya would be very bad as it would be a small state defined by ethnicity. This, according to Marlene Wind would be dangerous. I am not particularly in favour of states that are defined by ethnicity. Not quite sure why she singled out small states. Surely large states defined by ethnicity would be even worse? However even if we stick to small states, it would seem that Marlene is as ignorant of Danish society as she obviously is of Spain and Catalunya.

A brief comparison between Denmark and Catalunya would indicate that of the two countries, Denmark is incomparably a state defined by ethnicity, while Catalunya is clearly not.

Let us start with size, since this seems to be of some importance to Marlene Wind. Denmark is slightly larger in area – approximately 50,000 square km to 32,000 square km for Catalunya. On the other hand Catalunya is significantly more populous, with some 7,500,000 people, compared to 5,750,000 living in Denmark. Let us call it a draw and accept that both Denmark and Catalunya are relatively small countries.

With smallness not really a relevant factor, let us look for evidence or indications of ethnicity as the defining factor. Though Denmark is changing, it is still overwhelmingly a homogeneous country, with around 88% of the population of Danish origin. This is clearly not the case in Catalunya.  I do not have up to date figures, but people of Catalan origin are likely to make up no more than half the population, if that. Most of the rest come from other parts of Spain, while around 15% of the population is non Spanish. One thing seems to be very clear and that is that Catalunya is not in any sense a country defined by ethnicity. On the other hand it would seem that Denmark does fit that bill quite nicely.

If we turn to language, a similar picture emerges. While most Danish people will speak at least one other language, probably English, this is not the official position. The language of Denmark is Danish and I think that only Danish is used in Parliament. Public schools teach through the medium of Danish, even if they do teach other languages. Contrast this with Catalunya, where both Catalan and Castillian are official languages. MPs can speak in either language in Parliament.  Public schools in Catalunya are all bi-lingual. Though perhaps not quite as proficient as Danes, most Catalans will also speak a third and sometimes a fourth language. As is the case with Carles Puigdemont. On the language issue, if either country is to be accused of ethnic nationalism it would not be Catalunya.

When it comes to politics there is also a very clear divide between the two countries. While Denmark is rightly regarded as a progressive and welcoming country, it is also home to the far right Danish People’s Party. This is a party that is anti immigration, anti muslim and anti multi-culturalism. This far right party is not some minor aberration, but has 37 MPs in Parliament. Moreover the current centre-right government depends on these 37 MPs for its majority in Parliament. At the very least we have a bit of narrow, nasty ethnicity on the fringes of the government in Denmark.

In Catalunya by contrast none of the various parties that support independence fall into this far right, anti immigration, anti muslim, anti multi-culturalism so beloved of the Danish People’s Party. The exact opposite is the case. All the pro independence parties in Catalunya are actively in favour of an open, plural, pro-immigration society. It is not possible taint the pro independence parties with any kind of ethnic nationalism.

On the other hand some Spanish parties are more like the Danish People’s Party. Both the Partido Popular of Mariano Rajoy and Ciutadans are openly nationalist and anti immigration. It is just that they support Spanish nationalism and Spanish ethnicity.  They also seem to have the full support of Marlene Wind. Which somewhat tarnishes her apparently passionate opposition to ethnically defined states.

In her intervention Marlene clearly implied that small countries which were defined by ethnicity should not be independent. It is just as well that this injunction is not to be applied retrospectively. For then Denmark, as a country that is more clearly defined by ethnicity than Catalunya, would not deserve to continue as an independent country. It could apply to become part of the Federal Republic of Germany. And as Denmark would remain one of the richest parts of this expanded republic, with the highest possible degree of decentralisation, it would not regret having to give up its independence.

Initial reflections on the General Election

Well that was a bit of a surprise, which caught nearly everyone out. Unlike 2015 this time we do have a hung parliament, just. A well deserved mess for May and the Tories. No more strong and stable, just a shaky deal which relies on the DUP for any kind of majority.

The results in Scotland were also unexpected, at least in degree. Everyone expected the SNP to lose seats and the Tories to win some. But the extent of the changes caught most people out. What factors lie behind the voting in Scotland? Here are a few initial thoughts.

1. The Corbyn bounce was real and Labour secured one of their best ever results, particularly in terms of their share of the popular vote in England. This was around 40%. The party did not do so well in Scotland, with hardly any increase in their vote. However the party did win six seats. Almost certainly as a result of Corbyn’s appeal to younger and radical voters. Many of whom support Scottish independence, but like the idea of a Corbyn government at Westminster.
2. Though Brexit did not feature prominently in the debates during the campaign, it was undoubtedly a significant factor for many voters. Especially in those parts of the country where the leave vote was relatively strong – in the north east for example. As the only party to campaign on a hard Brexit platform, the Tories were the best placed to sweep up those leave voters for whom Brexit was the key issue.
3. In Scotland independence and a second indyref was one of the dominant issues in the campaign. While opposition to indyref2 took most of the headlines, the real factor was opposition to independence itself. In practice this amounted to opposition to the SNP. All three Unionist parties co-operated on this. There was clearly an informal Unionist pact among Labour, the LibDems and the Tories. They vied among each other as to who was best placed to defeat the SNP. And quite effective it was too. Which makes the SNP success in holding on to 35 seats even more amazing.
4. Though this was a UK election, most of the debates and campaigning in Scotland was about devolved issues. Education and the NHS came up in programmes again and again. Did this also happen in Wales?  Which is a bit strange as the outcome of a UK election has no practical bearing on what happens in the Scottish Parliament. The relentless focus on devolved issues was of course a deliberate tactic of the three Unionist parties. It clearly put the SNP, as the government in Scotland, on the defensive. This meant that the abysmal failures of the Tory government at Westminster – on the economy, defence, no Brexit plan etc – got pretty much a free pass. As with the independence issue we had the three Unionist parties all trying to make the election about the SNP and not about the Tory government at Westminster. In this of course they were ably assisted by the media, including the BBC.
5. An intriguing question is why did the LibDems and Labour agree to this informal pact with the Tories. I could understand this if it was a Holyrood election, after all the SNP is the government and deserve rigorous scrutiny. But this was not a Scottish election, but a UK one. I can also see why the Tories would want to focus on the SNP as they would have had a harder time if they had had to spend more time defending the record of the Tory government in London. But what was in it for the LibDems and Labour?
6. As regards the LibDems it may be that they realised that the Tories were going to win big in England and therefore they would have no influence at Westminster. So why not just attack the SNP and try and win back a few seats from them. If the Tories were going to be returned with an increased majority anyway, what difference would it make if the Tories also made gains in Scotland.
7. In the case of Labour this may also have been what motivated them to indulge in an informal anti SNP pact. However if true it may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for Labour in Scotland. If, as seems likely, they did not believe in a Corbyn victory, that does not augur well for the future relations between Scottish Labour and the UK party. What is potentially worse may be the dawning realisation that if the SNP had held on to even six more seats then the prospect of a Labour minority government would be a reality.  If only Labour in Scotland had relentlessly exposed their real enemy, the Tories, and campaigned with a stop the Tories message!
8. Returning to the UK results, it is worth remembering that these elections are conducted with the First Past the Post system (FPTP). This system is notoriously undemocratic and rarely, if ever, accurately reflects the votes cast. It was no different this time around, with both winners and losers. The winners were the Tories, DUP and SNP.  The Tories benefitted the most with fully 6.4% more seats than their share of the vote, which was only 42.4%. Yet they ended up with 48.4% of the seats. The SNP and DUP benefitted to a much lesser extent. The losers from FPTP were the LibDems, Greens and UKIP. The LibDems suffered the most, their 7.4% of the vote returning only 1.8% of the seats. Interesting to note that for both Labour and Plaid Cymru their share of seats matches almost exactly their share of the vote. FPTP can work in strange ways.

EFTA to the rescue?

Robin McAlpine has another article on Common Space on how to win indyref2.This time it is for an independent Scotland to join EFTA(European Free Trade Association]). Effectively this means joining, or staying in, the EU’s Single Market, but leaving the EU Customs Union.This could according to Robin “solve our trade problems, our Brexit problems, our ‘Europe’s bad for Scottish fishing and agriculture’ problems and more”. The other advantage according to Robin is that this  will help win indyref2 as this option would reassure those who voted to Leave the EU last summer.

These are quite considerable claims, and I am immediately reminded of the old adage: if something looks too good to be true, it probably is. It is interesting that in the article Robin makes this plea to the movement,”take tricky issues more seriously – borders, trade, tariffs and so on. These are real issues that won’t disappear through the power of rhetoric”. It is a very good plea. It is just a pity that Robin did not apply it to this article, which is long on rhetoric and remarkably free of evidence.

This lack of evidence is apparent in his comments on the EU. In order to make joining EFTA a better option, he clearly felt he needed to portray the EU in the worst possible light. According to Robin the EU is really, really bad.  Here are some of the things Robin has to say about the EU.  “I used to believe in the project when it was largely a social one. Now it has become a corporate project, I feel little commitment. The whole project is in crisis anyway and may not last. And with varying forms of extremist government in Poland, Hungary and Croatia and with France, Austria, Holland and others all being nip-and-tuck close to the same thing, it’s not anything like as attractive a project as it was.”

Robin also claims that the EU creates problems and imposes policies which harm Scottish interests. While remaining in the EU could result in Scotland being part of a political union with potential fascists.

All very disturbing if not downright nasty. But is any of it true? The claim that the EU has changed from a social project to a corporate one for example. Robin provides no clarification by what he means by a corporate project. Is this just the usual Lexit assertion that the EU is a bosses’ club. Or that the EU is dominated by business interests. It would help if Robin had provided us with some clarity as regards to what he means by this term, corporate project. It would also help if he had offered us some evidence to support this claim. It seems to betray some ignorance of how the EU came about. A clue can be found in the Treaty of Rome, way back in the mid 1950s. This treaty established the European Economic Community, popularly known as the Common Market. Subsequently this name has changed to the Single Market. But it is quite clear that from its inception the EU has always been about economics. For most member states, other than the UK under Tory rule, the Common or Single Market has always included social measures along with health and safety. So pace Robin there is no fundamental divide between the economic and the social in the EU.

What about the claim that the project is in crisis and may not last. Again no evidence is provided to back up this assertion. It is begs the question of why is Robin so keen on Scotland joining EFTA and the Single Market. If the EU does collapse, so will the Single Market. For Robin to spend so much time extolling the benefits of Scotland joining the Single Market, I can only assume that he does not expect the EU to collapse and only included this unfounded assertion in order to further denigrate the EU.

The same applies to his suggestion that extremists are on the verge of taking over many member states and that the EU could become a political union with potential fascists. Again no evidence is offered. I am surprised that Robin is peddling this line as his claim boils down to the following. It would be extremely bad for Scottish ministers to enter a room with extremists and potential fascists and get involved in discussing and voting on decisions affecting the Single Market. On the other hand it is just dandy for these same extremists and potential fascists to influence and vote on these decisions which Scotland would then have to just accept.  Doesn’t make much sense to me.

His other claim that the EU creates problems and imposes policies which harm Scottish interests is also evidence free. Only agriculture and fisheries are mentioned in his article. Does this mean that these are the only two sectors of the Scottish economy which have problems with the EU? Even with these two sectors no actual evidence is provided. We know that many, most? farmers and fishermen oppose the EU, but are we reduced to accepting at face value whatever any interest group asserts? What about some serious analysis Robin?

This sudden concern for farmers and fishermen also sits rather awkwardly with Robin’s earlier article on How to win indy2 with a new story. There Robin was insistent that “polling evidence also states clearly that if we don’t have a story that works for people who earn less than £25,000 a year, we lose.” Not sure how that squares with appealing or appeasing the mostly rich farmers and fishermen.

Having tried to establish that the EU is really bad and we should leave it, Robin goes on to recommend that Scotland stays in the Single Market by joining EFTA. Remaining in the Single Market would be beneficial for Scotland according to Robin, something I wholeheartedly agree with. However Robin also recommend that Scotland leaves the EU Customs Union. This would allow Scotland to negotiate its own trade deals with other countries.

There is one other country that Robin has in mind for a new trade deal, and this is the UK or what would by then have become rUK. Robin is much taken with the fact that rUK is the destination for most of Scotland’s exports and naturally does not want to damage this trade.  As Robin himself puts it, “Nevertheless, exports to the UK really are much more important to us at the moment than exports to the EU and we need to take that seriously.   There is a very straightforward solution to this which solves all these problems and that’s to agree a British Isles Trade Zone.”

Now, as a solution this does seem a bit on the grandiose side. Not to mention perhaps just a bit fantastical. Again it all depends on what Robin means by his use of the term ‘British Isles’. This is not a term much, if at all in current use. Older atlases of the vintage of my childhood did use the term British Isles to cover England, Wales, Scotland, all of Ireland and the many other smaller islands. However this term is hardly if ever used nowadays. If Robin intends his Trade Zone to include the Republic the term should have been a British and Irish Isles Trade Zone.  On the other hand if Robin simply means a Trade Zone between and independent Scotland and rUK, why not just say so. I cannot see how the Republic could sign such a deal as long as it remains in the EU.

I confess to being completely confused as to what Robin is advocating here. All the more so, as he offers no clarification as to how this would be agreed and exactly what it would cover. A couple of further points on this. Robin talks about a tariff free trade deal. However, given that tariffs on goods are generally very low, the main obstacles to trade are the non-tarrif barriers. These can include the standards and regulations that characterise the Single Market for example. The Single Market which rUK is committed to leaving. So there may be little scope for a deal which includes much in the way of non-tariff barriers. Secondly trade deals do not tend to include services. Something that is important to the Scottish economy. Thirdly by being in the Single Market, but not the Customs Union there will be additional costs on Scottish businesses. As one of the comments to Robin’s article puts it. “An additional difficulty is that under EFTA/EEA route, Scotland would be outside the customs union and therefore subject to EU rules of origin (which are often higher barriers than default WTO tariffs). This would harm Scottish manufacturing exporters, and moreover, make it less attractive to rUK firms seeking to relocate (who instead might just choose Ireland).”

All of which demonstrates that Robin’s solution may be much, much more complicated than he is prepared to admit, and may incur some serious downsides.

Finally Robin claims that this option – leaving the EU, but remaining in the Single Market – will help win the next independence referendum. The argument here is that, “We’re definitely losing people who previously supported independence but post-Brexit don’t.” By leaving the EU and joining EFTA instead we can win these voters back. As Robin puts it, “Admitting that on independence Scotland will be in EFTA and that we would then have to choose a route forward from there offers reassurance that Eurosceptics would still have some degree of agency on the EU issue if they vote for independence.”

I have to say this sound very much like clutching at straws. By staying in the Single Market, Scotland will have to agree to 1) the free movement of people; 2) implement all the rules, regulations and directives emanating from the EU; 3) accepting the primacy of the EU Court of Justice in settling disputes; 4) continue to pay a fee to the EU.  I would like Robin to explain which of these conditions Leavers agree with. All the evidence is that it was precisely to get out of these conditions (take back control, remember) that most Leavers voted the way they did.

Common Weal White Paper 2

The second section of Common Weal’s White Paper considers the Key Institutions of an Independent Scotland. This apparently will include reforming our current Scottish Parliament. The White Paper calls for two specific changes: 1. increasing the number of MSPs and 2. creating a Citizens Chamber. What is notable about both suggested reforms is that no context for either is provided. Common Weal just asserts that they will be necessary.

As regards a Citizens Chamber the justification according to the White Paper is that Scotland does not have a revising chamber and would no longer have Westminster, the House of Lords or any other parliamentary body with the power to examine its work. While it is true that Scotland does not have a revising chamber, I am not sure that Westminster or the House of Lords offer much in the way of scrutiny. There is also the not insignificant matter of democratic legitimacy. Which I would suggest both bodies conspicuously lack in relation to Scotland. So losing their input is not much of a loss at all as far as I can see.

The unstated assumption behind this claim is that Scotland needs a revising chamber. But no evidence whatsoever is provided as to why this is so. In particular no reference is made to the actual experience of other independent countries. While many countries do have a revising or second chamber, nearly all of them are countries with much, much larger populations than Scotland.

For countries with a population similar to Scotland or less than Scotland’s, a unicameral parliament is the norm. For example of the 10 member states of the European Union with a population similar to or less than Scotland, eight manage successfully with just one chamber. Only Ireland and Slovenia have felt it necessary to have a revising chamber.  Outwith the EU, nine of the 10 countries with populations similar to or less than Scotland also manage with just one parliamentary chamber. The Exception is Bosnia and Herzegovina, which may have its recent bloody history as a reason for needing a second chamber.

Looking beyond Europe there does not appear to be much evidence that a revising chamber for small countries is needed. Our antipodean cousins in New Zealand also manage to run a successful country with just one chamber.

None of the above means that creating a revising chamber is not something worth considering. It should mean at the very least that someone explains why Scotland needs an additional chamber when just about every other country of similar size manages well without one.

The other claim is that we will need to increase the number of MSPs with independence. As the White Paper puts it: “Upon independence the Scottish Parliament shall take on all responsibilities currently reserved to Westminster as well as maintaining existing responsibilities, leading to a substantial increase in workload which cannot be performed by the existing Parliament. The number of members of the Scottish Parliament shall therefore be expanded to reflect the loss of Members of Parliament at Westminster.”

Notice that this is not a recommendation. The use of the word “shall” implies that an increase in the number of MSPs will happen. However once again no context for this is provided. For example how does the size of the Scottish Parliament compare with parliaments in other similar countries? At first glance this comparison does provide some grounds for a larger number of MSPs. Of the five EU countries with a population very much similar in size to Scotland, all five have a larger number of parliamentarians. However there is no pattern to this. The numbers range from 150 for Slovakia to 179 for Denmark, while Finland has 200 MPs.

It is not obvious why there is such a wide range. Which emphasises a key point – there does not appear to be any clear relationship between the population of a country and the number of MPs in parliament. This holds true for countries outwith the EU. Macedonia with a population of around two million has a parliament with 123 MPs, while Moldova with a three and a half million people manages with just 101 MPs.

The other important factor in all this is that irrespective of the size of the population of a country, its government and parliament will have to carry out pretty much the same functions. This applies to even very small countries such as Luxembourg, Malta etc. Estonia for example has a population of 1.3 million and a parliament with 101 members. Yet Estonia manages to sustain a government with 14 ministries in addition to the Prime Minister. The same is true for countries outwith Europe. Costa Rica with five million people somehow manages with just 57 MPs. Perhaps a more relevant example is our friends in the south pacific, New Zealand. With a population slightly smaller than Scotland, New Zealand manages to successfully run itself and promote the country internationally, with a parliament of 120 MPs.

Once again this is not to say that an increase in the number of MSPs is out of the question. However it is incumbent on those proposing this increase to explain why it is necessary. Especially as this will inevitably involve some considerable expense and disruption. In particular they need to explain why this imperative has to form part of the prospective for independence. If New Zealand can manage as a successful independent country with 120 MPs I am convinced that Scotland can do so with 129MPs.