Tag Archives: Scottish Parliament

In Defence of Murdo Fraser

I must point out that this post is not about Murdo Fraser as a person. I have never had the good or misfortune to have met the man personally. So I have nothing to say about him. Nor am I about to defend his political positions as I oppose just about everything he and other conservatives stand for.

No, this post is a defence of Mr Fraser’s right to be a MSP. I regularly on twitter come across comments to the effect that Mr Fraser has never “won” an election, has repeatedly been “rejected” by the voters and therefore has no right to be in Parliament at all.

I find this argument not just unconvincing, but a serious misrepresentation and attack on the voting system we have for elections to Holyrood. It is also potentially dangerous as it could lead to a change is this system.

Our electoral system for the Scottish Parliament is a hybrid one, a mixture of First Past the Post(FPTP)  and Proportional Representation(PR). It is similar to the system used in Germany. There are 73 constituencies, each of which elects one MSP by FPTP. The other 56 MSPs are elected  in eight regional constituencies, each of which elects seven MSPs. These Additional Members are elected using a form of PR.

The system is deliberately designed to ensure that the total representation from each of the eight regions, including those MSPs elected by FPTP, corresponds more closely to the share of the votes cast for each political party in that region.

The key word here is representation. The system as a whole is not about winning, but about ensuring fair representation in Parliament for the parties that the electors have voted for.

In this sense Mr Fraser has as much right to be in Parliament as any other MSP, irrespective of whether elected by FPTP or PR.  Mr Fraser was elected by the voters in the Mid-Scotland Fife regional constituency. Or more precisely, by the 25% of the voters in the region who voted Conservative in the 2016 election.

These conservative voters have the same right to be fairly represented in Parliament as do the 6% who voted for the Green party, or the 7% who voted for the LibDems, or the 18% who voted Labour, or the 41% who voted SNP.  All these voters are entitled to be as fairly as possible represented in Parliament.

The hybrid system we use in Scotland is not a fully proportional system. This is due to the larger number of MSPs elected by FPTP. In Germany their version of the Additional Member System is fully proportional. This means that there can always be some small anomalies.

As happened in the 2016 election in Mid-Scotland and Fife region. However the anomaly did not affect the number of MSPs elected for the Greens, the LidDems, nor for the Conservatives. It did though affect the number of MSPs elected for the SNP and Labour. The SNP vote share of 41% should have resulted in seven MSPs. However as the SNP won eight of the single member constituencies, elected by FPTP, they were able to retain all of these eight MSPs. To the detriment of Labour, whose 18% share of the vote should have given them three MSPs instead of the two they were allocated.

So, if anybody wants to reconsider the justness of the results in 2016 in Mid-Scotland it would not be about the Conservatives, but about how an unfair system resulted in the SNP winning a seat that should have gone to Labour. Any takers?

As a complement to the above, I did a bit of research into the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, using the House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7599. This Briefing Papers gives all the details about that election. I was particularly interested in the share of the vote for the “winning” candidates in the 73 single member constituencies.

It transpires that only 29 of the “winning” candidates won over 50% of the votes in their constituency. This represents just 40% of the 73 constituency MSPs. Or just over 22% of all 129 MSPs. Or to put is another way,  44 constituency MSPs were rejected by a majority of the voters in their constituency. This amounts to 60% of all constituency MSPs.

In this context it is worth noting that eight constituency MSPs “won” their seat with less than 40% of the votes cast. Quite how this is regarded as legitimate while Mr Fraser and the other regional MSPs can be held to be illegitimate is a bit beyond me.

Out of interest the MSP with the lowest “winning” share of the vote is none other than Ruth Davidson. She was elected in Edinburgh Central with just 30.4%  of the votes cast. Of these eight MSPs elected with less than 40% of the votes cast, four are Conservative, two are Labour and two are SNP.

None of the previous paragraph should be interpreted as denying these eight MSPs their right to be in Parliament. What it should do is to raise some serious questions about the legitimacy of retaining FPTP as part of our electoral system.

I would much prefer a fully PR system. Parliament is where our representatives sit. As such the terms winning and losing should be used much less often. What matters is fair representation for the way voters cast their votes.  For those interested in this I would recommend a look at the systems used in Denmark and Sweden.



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Common Weal White Paper 2

The second section of Common Weal’s White Paper considers the Key Institutions of an Independent Scotland. This apparently will include reforming our current Scottish Parliament. The White Paper calls for two specific changes: 1. increasing the number of MSPs and 2. creating a Citizens Chamber. What is notable about both suggested reforms is that no context for either is provided. Common Weal just asserts that they will be necessary.

As regards a Citizens Chamber the justification according to the White Paper is that Scotland does not have a revising chamber and would no longer have Westminster, the House of Lords or any other parliamentary body with the power to examine its work. While it is true that Scotland does not have a revising chamber, I am not sure that Westminster or the House of Lords offer much in the way of scrutiny. There is also the not insignificant matter of democratic legitimacy. Which I would suggest both bodies conspicuously lack in relation to Scotland. So losing their input is not much of a loss at all as far as I can see.

The unstated assumption behind this claim is that Scotland needs a revising chamber. But no evidence whatsoever is provided as to why this is so. In particular no reference is made to the actual experience of other independent countries. While many countries do have a revising or second chamber, nearly all of them are countries with much, much larger populations than Scotland.

For countries with a population similar to Scotland or less than Scotland’s, a unicameral parliament is the norm. For example of the 10 member states of the European Union with a population similar to or less than Scotland, eight manage successfully with just one chamber. Only Ireland and Slovenia have felt it necessary to have a revising chamber.  Outwith the EU, nine of the 10 countries with populations similar to or less than Scotland also manage with just one parliamentary chamber. The Exception is Bosnia and Herzegovina, which may have its recent bloody history as a reason for needing a second chamber.

Looking beyond Europe there does not appear to be much evidence that a revising chamber for small countries is needed. Our antipodean cousins in New Zealand also manage to run a successful country with just one chamber.

None of the above means that creating a revising chamber is not something worth considering. It should mean at the very least that someone explains why Scotland needs an additional chamber when just about every other country of similar size manages well without one.

The other claim is that we will need to increase the number of MSPs with independence. As the White Paper puts it: “Upon independence the Scottish Parliament shall take on all responsibilities currently reserved to Westminster as well as maintaining existing responsibilities, leading to a substantial increase in workload which cannot be performed by the existing Parliament. The number of members of the Scottish Parliament shall therefore be expanded to reflect the loss of Members of Parliament at Westminster.”

Notice that this is not a recommendation. The use of the word “shall” implies that an increase in the number of MSPs will happen. However once again no context for this is provided. For example how does the size of the Scottish Parliament compare with parliaments in other similar countries? At first glance this comparison does provide some grounds for a larger number of MSPs. Of the five EU countries with a population very much similar in size to Scotland, all five have a larger number of parliamentarians. However there is no pattern to this. The numbers range from 150 for Slovakia to 179 for Denmark, while Finland has 200 MPs.

It is not obvious why there is such a wide range. Which emphasises a key point – there does not appear to be any clear relationship between the population of a country and the number of MPs in parliament. This holds true for countries outwith the EU. Macedonia with a population of around two million has a parliament with 123 MPs, while Moldova with a three and a half million people manages with just 101 MPs.

The other important factor in all this is that irrespective of the size of the population of a country, its government and parliament will have to carry out pretty much the same functions. This applies to even very small countries such as Luxembourg, Malta etc. Estonia for example has a population of 1.3 million and a parliament with 101 members. Yet Estonia manages to sustain a government with 14 ministries in addition to the Prime Minister. The same is true for countries outwith Europe. Costa Rica with five million people somehow manages with just 57 MPs. Perhaps a more relevant example is our friends in the south pacific, New Zealand. With a population slightly smaller than Scotland, New Zealand manages to successfully run itself and promote the country internationally, with a parliament of 120 MPs.

Once again this is not to say that an increase in the number of MSPs is out of the question. However it is incumbent on those proposing this increase to explain why it is necessary. Especially as this will inevitably involve some considerable expense and disruption. In particular they need to explain why this imperative has to form part of the prospective for independence. If New Zealand can manage as a successful independent country with 120 MPs I am convinced that Scotland can do so with 129MPs.


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Too little, too late?

Is the above to be the long term verdict on the Smith Commission recommendations, published today? First thought, Lord Smith and his team deserve a warmth round of thanks. To have come up with any kind of agreement among the five political parties is quite an achievement it itself. The Commission also seems to have done a fair job of media management. Nearly all of the media are reporting the proposals in glowing terms, or in the case of some English outlets at least as some significant new powers for Scotland. First impressions from the media, however, are rarely very reliable indicators of lasting success.

My reading of the report chimes very much with the verdict of Professor Michael Keating from Aberdeen University, who sums up the report thus: The Smith commission report provides the minimum amount of extra devolution required to meet the expectations raised by the famous ‘vow’ from the three UK party leaders in the last week of the referendum campaign. Minimum amount of change perfectly describes the essentials of the recommendations.

Not to be churlish, there are a few positives in the report relating to the Crown Estate in Scotland, Air Passenger Duty, elections and the operation of the Scottish Parliament, and a few others. All important, but hardly the stuff of Devo-Max or a Powerhouse Parliament.

However the recommendations have to be judged against the objectives set out by the Commission itself. It refers to them as the three pillars:

  1. providing a durable but responsive constitutional settlement for the    governance of Scotland
  2. delivering prosperity, a healthy economy, jobs, and social justice
  3. strengthening the financial responsibility of the Scottish Parliament

It is not clear that the recommendations will fully achieve any of these pillars. As regards the first – a durable and responsive constitutional settlement – there are two obvious weaknesses. The first is that without a written constitution there is no way that the current or proposed constitutional settlement can be made permanent. UK legislation can state whatever it likes, but no legislation can bind any future government. It is also noteworthy that the report recommends that changes to the electoral system or the workings of the Scottish Parliament be subject to a two-thirds majority. This limitation and requirement is to be imposed on the Scottish Parliament by legislation at Westminster. However no such requirement is deemed necessary for Westminster itself.

This highlights the other weakness in the proposals, namely that they focus entirely on Scotland. This may seem a strange criticism, but given the result of the referendum, any proposals for constitutional change need to take account of how they will affect the governance of the UK as a whole. This not exactly the fault of the Commission which was restricted in its remit. However it does raise serious question marks as to the willingness of the rest of the UK to accept the recommendations as they stand.

When it comes to the economy, jobs and social justice, there is very little change at all. It is amazing to see how often a paragraph ends with the words – will remain reserved. In this case all of pensions and effectively all of welfare are to remain reserved matters. The Scottish Parliament will have new powers to create new benefits in areas of devolved responsibility. However these can only be at the margins as any monies to be spent will need to be raised by the Scottish government. Which is only right and proper, but the report contains virtually nothing in the way of substantive additional revenue raising powers.

Which leads nicely on to the final pillar – financial responsibility. While a lot of noise will be made about the recommendations in this area, they amount to little more than re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. The Scottish Parliament will gain the power to set the rates and thresholds for personal income tax and the first 10% of the standard rate of VAT will be assigned to Scotland. This is all fine and dandy, but in return the current block grant assigned to Scotland will be reduced by exactly the same amount. We gain no say or control over the rates of VAT. While income tax is important it is only one of many, many taxes available to governments and one which will prove in practice, difficult to change from the rates set by Westminster. Richard Murphy of Tax Research UK explains here, why devolving income tax is the worst possible solution for everyone. All the other revenue sources remain reserved.

So, all in all, the recommendations are pretty timid and completely fail to address the key issue facing the UK as a whole, namely the over centralisation of power. Political power will remain concentrated at Westminster, while economic power will remain concentrated in London. Not much was expected from the Smith Commission and in this respect it has not disappointed.

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Engaging with the Smith Commission

Now that the referendum is well and truly over, the only show in town is the Smith Commission. This is the UK government’s way of taking forward the famous or infamous Vow made by the leaders of the three Unionist parties at Westminster. A commission to be headed by a member of the House of Lords. All very typically British. Yet, the good Lord Smith has been welcomed by the SNP and others in the pro-independence movement. Despite the top down nature of the work of the Commission there is scope for members of the public to contribute, Have your say – Submitting ideas, views and proposals to the Commission, which you can access here. We should all be encouraging as many people as possible to submit their views on what further powers they think should be transferred to the Scottish Parliament.

There is a restriction however on what the Commission will consider. As an initiative of the UK government, the Commission has been asked to come up with recommendations for further devolution of powers to strengthen the Scottish Parliament within the UK. This is hardly surprising and there is no point in bemoaning this. While independence is off the table, there remains a great deal of scope to challenge the current constitutional set up of the UK. In point of fact the good Lord positively invites us to do so. In the Guidelines that the Commission has published there is a list of key questions for people to consider when making a submission. One is, What is your assessment of the current situation? This seems to me to be an open invitation to point out the weaknesses and failures inherent in the current devolution settlement. Below is my initial attempt at this analysis.

Despite the creation of the three devolved parliaments/assemblies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the UK remains a very centralised state. As has been noted many times, power devolved is power retained. The current situation is also, in part because of this centralisation of power, and in part due to the rather haphazard and ad hoc way in which devolution had developed, a very unstable settlement. This is the case both in relation to devolved and non devolved powers.

The current situation in relation to devolved powers

1. Constitutional issues
As all three devolved parliaments/assemblies are the result of Acts of the UK Parliament, they can all be amended or even abolished by another Act of the UK Parliament. While this extreme, abolition, may be regarded as unlikely, its possibility is a clear demonstration of the fact that final power remains with Westminster. It is also the case that only the UK Parliament can legislate changes to the current settlements. Whatever consensus there may be in Scotland or Wales or Northern Ireland for additional powers, the final say still depends on the approval of Westminster.

This combination of power retained and uncertainty has been compounded by the lack of a corresponding devolution settlement for England. Thus Westminster remains a most confusing miss mash of powers and responsibilities. The UK Parliament and government exercises power over at least four discrete geographical areas: 1. for the whole of the UK e.g. defence and foreign affairs, 2, sometimes for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 3, sometimes for England and Wales, and 4. sometimes just for England. In addition the UK Parliament effectively acts as the government of Scotland when it has sole power to set the level of the block grant for the Scottish Parliament. The UK Parliaments acts in a similar way as the government of Wales and the government of Northern Ireland when it sets their block grants.

This lack of clarity about the precise role and powers of Westminster can also be seen in the difficulties that all UK parties have had in relation to English Votes for English Laws (EVEL). That EVEL has become an issue is itself a direct consequence of the failure to create a devolved English Parliament.

2. Finance
The concentration of powers at Westminster also applies to how the three devolved parliaments/assemblies are financed. The Scottish Parliament, like the other two devolved administrations, has operational and policy making powers over the various devolved areas – education, the NHS etc. However the Scottish Parliament has only limited powers over its revenues. That this is due to change in 2016, with the implementation of the latest changes decided at Westminster is clear evidence that the current situation regarding finances is unsatisfactory. Further evidence of this is that all three UK parties made the devolution of further revenue raising powers to the Scottish Parliament a key part of their campaign during the recent referendum.

The prime reason for this dissatisfaction with the current situation is that reliance on another body for finance means that the Scottish Parliament is not fully in control of all aspects of the devolved matters. Even with the planned changes for 2016 and the published proposals from the UK parties for further tax raising powers Westminster will remain in control of most of the Scottish Parliament’s budget.

This is a matter of concern both in terms of democracy and good governance. That a Westminster government with little or no mandate over devolved matters has the power to alter the block grant is profoundly undemocratic. The practice of good governance is enhanced when the body that has legislative powers for policy and spending also has the responsibility and powers to raise the monies to be spent. The lack of this key power over revenues is a disincentive to good governance and a continuing source of friction between the devolved parliaments/assemblies and Westminster.

The current situation in relation to non devolved powers

The history of devolution in the UK is one of a succession of ad hoc decisions by the UK parliament. Beginning with the demand for Home Rule for Ireland. A demand which Westminster failed to respond to adequately. In each successive case Westminster has re-acted to pressure from one or other of the three peripheral nations – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. As the history of each of these nations within the UK has been different, the Westminster response has also been different. In the case of Scotland this meant that devolution was essentially limited to giving the Scottish Parliament control over the matters that already had administrative devolution. At no stage in this process has there been any serious attempt by Westminster to to develop a coherent constitutional settlement for the whole of the UK. Such an exercise would inevitably include considering the powers that remain the exclusive preserve of Westminster. This is further confirmation that the UK remains a very centralised state when it comes to the exercise of power. To secure a stable and lasting devolution settlement for all of the UK will require all parties to re-examine the range of reserved powers, to determine which can be devolved.

This over centralisation of power at Westminster has had serious economic consequences for all parts of the UK. All UK governments have found it very hard, if not impossible, to govern in the interests of all parts of the UK. The latest recession – the deepest and longest lasting in modern times – is but the most recent example of this. The south east of England, including London seems to be the area that has most benefitted from Westminster policies. London and its environs seems to inevitably dominate the policies of all UK governments. With little in the way of economic and social levers available to other parts of the country this has resulted in a very uneven and unequal economy.


The UK still suffers from an over centralisation of power. The establishment of parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has alleviated this over centralisation, though only in part. Westminster remains the supreme and in many cases the only source of power. The failure to find a devolution settlement for England leaves the current situation in a state of seemingly permanent flux. The failure to give the devolved parliaments/assemblies sufficient tax raising powers to cover their spending means there remains a lack of democratic accountability at the heart of the current devolution situation.

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